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Abstract Recovery represents a new paradigm in the field of mental health. It6
refers hereby less to the possibility of relief from symptoms than to the indi-7
vidual’s capacity to develop a meaningful life and a self-concept beyond the8
illness. Several countries adopted recovery oriented approaches to implement9
mental health service reforms and attracted considerable scientific interest on10
that subject matter. A comprehensive theory of the recovery process is how-11
ever still missing. The present article argues for an analytic approach to the12
socio-cognitive components in the di↵erent stages of the subject’s recovery13
process. By the means of narratives from mental health patients, a dramatic14
loss of internal territoriality (“locus”) is evidenced in psychiatric treatment,15
whereby a subject in crisis renounces its internality to the professionals’ au-16
thority. The eventual process of a subject’s recovery, we suggest, has to be17
regarded as an inverse process, in which internality is privately and socially18
reclaimed and defended in terms of ownership and responsibility. The phe-19
nomenon of users’ social movements, such as Madpride, is suggested as a20
form of re-conquest of social territory by the means of emancipatory pride.21
The mental components of the recovery process represent, in a large part,22
concepts from the theoretic framework of Cristiano Castelfranchi and his as-23
sociates. A conception of the subject emerges whereby recovery is ideated24
literally as a process of “re-covering” aka protecting the subject’s internality25
against the psychiatric/institutional gaze and rule of private a↵airs.26
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The explanatory power of the concepts CristianoCastelfranchi developedwith1
his group in the field of artificial intelligence extends as far as to the realm of2
mental health, a field of research where Cristiano made occasional interven-3
tions and contributions since the start of the anti-psychiatricmovement in Italy4
led by Franco Basaglia. While his main focus of activity has remained over the5
years on AI and theoretic psychology his work is getting growing attention in6
fields as various as economic psychology, sociology, clinical psychology and7
philosophy. The contribution at hand reports to a large extent a theoretic draft8
on recovery from mental illness as discussed and elaborated with Cristiano9
in various occasions. In the past years, we had the great opportunity to ex-10
change with Cristiano on several issues, ranging from recovery from serious11
mental illness up to the psychology of money. We have gradually metabolized12
(the process is still ongoing) and appreciate the significance of the large the-13
oretic body of Cristiano’s work and even more learned to esteem him as an14
admirable tutor and generous friend. Besides the evident use of a theory of15
recovery which we will draft here, we present this work as a case of how his16
theoretic approach allows for the understanding of almost any domain of hu-17
man action. How and under what conditions does the goal of recovery emerge18
and be achieved will be the guiding question of the paper at hand.19
1 Recovery: a new paradigm in mental health20
Recovery is a key concept of the new mental health approach to mental ill-21
ness and to reorient mental health services. In the last years, the recovery22
oriented paradigm has been adopted in many countries for the implemen-23
tation of mental health service reforms (e.g. UK, Australia, USA). The Care24
Services Improvement Partnership, the Royal College of Psychiatrists, and the25
Social Care Institute for Excellence (2007), announced Recovery as a common26
purpose for the future of mental health services, emphasizing the need for27
a better understanding of the recovery approach. Definitions, methods, the28
role of agents in the process as well as its measurement stand and fall with29
the conceptual strength of the underlying theory (see hereto also chapter X30
in the policy manual as published by the American Psychological Association31
(2009); and the same published by the American Association of Community32
Psychiatrist: Sowers (2005)). Even if researchers have investigated the field and33
proposed intuitive models to grasp the recovery process, its components and34
conditions (e.g. Anthony, 1993; Jacobson & Greenley, 2001), explanation and35
description of the phenomenon have remained ambiguous.36
First, a clear definition of recovery is missing (Farkas, 2007; Sowers, 2005).37
It is worthwhile noting that the origins of the Recovery approach had and still38
have a considerable di culty to cross the Anglo-Saxon-language borders. This39
di culty might be due to a missing correspondence of the recovery term in40
other languages without losing its rich semantic and metaphoric sense which41
might constitute an element to the success of the recovery approach’s spread:42
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“to re-cover: 1) To obtain again after losing; regain, as property, self-control, health,1
ect. 2) To make up for; retrieve, as a loss. 3) To restore (oneself) to natural balance,2
health, etc. 4) In sports, to regain (one’s normal position of guard, balance, etc.). 6) Law3
a To gain in judicial proceedings: to recover judgment. b To gain or regain by legal4
process.” (Webster Comprehensive Dictionary, 2003).5
“Etymological dictionaries: c.1300, "to regain consciousness," fromAnglo-Fr. rekev-6
erer (late 13c.), O.Fr. recovrer, fromL. recuperare "to recover" (see recuperation).Mean-7
ing "to regain health or strength" is from early 14c.; sense of "to get (anything) back"8
is first attested mid-14c.9
The academic literature on mental health distinguishes at least three facets10
of recovery. It is conceptualized as11
1. a spontaneous event of recovery from all the symptoms after illness;12
2. a symptomatic recovery caused by treatment;13
3. an experience of revitalization of proper life in a state of illness even in14
the persistence of symptoms (Ralph and Corrigan, 2005) – some authors15
refer to the last form of recovery as “social recovery” to distinguish it from16
“clinical recovery”.17
Clinical recovery concerns the alleviation of symptoms and the return to18
premorbid functioning (Young and Ensing, 1999), whereas social recovery19
implies neither symptom remission nor necessity of a return to the premorbid20
state (W. Anthony, Rogers, & Farkas, 2003; Deegan, 1996).21
Analyzing first-person narratives of recovered persons, the Center for Psy-22
chiatricRehabilitationatBostonUniversityhasdevelopedaworkingdefinition23
of recovery as “a deeply personal, unique process of changing one’s attitudes,24
values, feelings, goals, skills and roles. It is a way of living a satisfying, hope-25
ful, and contributing life even with limitations caused by the illness. Recovery26
involves the development of new meaning and purpose in one’s life as one27
grows beyond the catastrophic e↵ects of mental illness” (W. A. Anthony, 1993).28
Very similar but based on personal experience, Deegan (1988) defines recovery29
as “a process, a way of life, an attitude, and a way of approaching the day’s30
challenges”. In both perspectives a basic agreement on the conceptualization31
of recovery exists as a social process, as an outcome and both. However, both32
definitions imply a number of unspecified concepts such as attitudes, values,33
feelings and goals.34
An influential model of recovery developed for the state of Wisconsin ex-35
perimentation was proposed by Jacobson and Greenley (2001) in which they36
undertook a principal division of recovery’s key conditions into internal and37
external factors:38
• Internal key conditions: hope, healing, empowerment and connection;39
• external key conditions: human rights, apositive cultureof healing, recovery-40
oriented services.41
The “model”, however, provides no clear definitions of the concepts de-42
scribing these conditions, nor su cient explanations of their functioning, but43
just gives an account of a number of fuzzy concepts.44
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Farkas (2007) identifies four “core recovery values” that support the recov-1
ery process and which appear to be commonly reflected and referred to in2
consumer and recovery literature:3
1. Person-orientation has emerged from the narratives of the consumers since4
most of them report damages due to the non holistic approach of the5
services.Hence, a recovery oriented service is based on the strength instead6
of the deficits of the persons.With respect to thedesign of recovery oriented7
mental health services Farkas recommends the consideration of8
2. Person-involvement in the planning anddelivery of the services to develop9
a sense of empowerment;10
3. Self-determination and self-choice are considered the cornerstones of a re-11
covery process to strengthen the self;12
4. Hope is an essential ingredient for the recovering user and not least for the13
professionals who need to support the aspirations of recovery especially14
during the setbacks. “Hope means remembering, (. . . ), that recovery can15
be a long-term process with many setbacks and plateaus along the way.”16
(Farkas, 2007, p. 68).17
Clearly, these “core values” refer to recovery-oriented services more than18
to the recovery process per se. There is an agreement in the literature on19
mental healthcare that the disregard of personal aspects is necessarily ruinous20
so that person-centered models are mandatory. A person-centered model of21
care is considered to be based on the needs and preferences of the person,22
involves its primary relationships as sources of support, focuses on capacities23
and strengths, and accepts risks, failures, uncertainties, and setbacks as natural24
and expected parts of learning and self-determination (Davidson et al, 2003;25
O’Brien & Lovett, 1992). In such a model, professionals learn to respect the26
users will and start to “involve” them in each decision of their process to27
recovery.28
Ron Coleman’s autobiographic description of his recovery published in29
“Recovery An Alien Concept” (2004) presents important material for a socio-30
cognitive theory. He identifies “people”, “self” and “ownership” as the three31
stepping stones to recovery:32
• People, since “Recovery is by definitionwholeness and no one can bewhole33
if they are isolated from the society in which they live andwork” (Coleman,34
2004, p.14); further,35
• “Recovery requires self-confidence, self-esteem, self-awareness and self-36
acceptance without this recovery is not just impossible, it is not worth it.”37
(ibd, p.15); and38
• Ownership “For it is only through owning the experience of madness can39
we own the recovery from madness” (ibd, p.16).40
In his view to achieve recovery, a shift in the paradigm from biological re-41
ductionism to one of societal and personal development is necessary. As other42
recovery key issues he elaborates on the reclamation of power and the demand43
of acceptance.44
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Taking into account the narratives of Ron Coleman (2004) and other recov-1
ered voice hearers, Marius Romme (2009) defines recovery as the “taking life2
back into your own hands (. . . ) using one’s own capabilities andmaking one’s3
own dreams come true.(. . . ) Recovery means take back power and use it to4
copewith own voices and problem, (. . . ) create choices that make it possible to5
take responsibility for their life and emotions, and by doing so heighten their6
self-esteem” (Romme, 2009 p. 9, p. 27).7
Other researchers which have analyzed the narratives of recovered persons8
(Topor, 2001; 2006; 2011; Davidson, 2003) stress the role of “the others” for9
the recovery process. Particularly, friendships before the start of an illness and10
family members create the red thread in a person’s life, often guarantying11
a↵ective and even material support. The peculiar emphasis on the relations12
with others which share the same experiences can be traced in the biographies13
aswell as in academic literature. In biographies the role of peers is central: peers14
facilitate the renewing of a sense of hope for the future; create the climate15
of support and solidarity which helps the person in the feeling of mutual16
understanding and help for the others and reduces loneliness. For so called17
“schizophrenic” patients the “discovery” that voices are a reality for others18
as well, allows for a reframing of the voice hearers’ personal condition. Peers19
also have a positive e↵ect on the self-management of symptoms. They have20
a privileged position in teaching the know-how of managing the symptoms,21
since they can convey the lessons they have learned from personal experience,22
whereas professionals cannot.23
Besides these empirical and autobiographic accounts of the recovery pro-24
cess, an interesting contribution has been provided by Hopper (2007). He pro-25
poses Amartya Sen’s (1993) notion of capabilities as an alternative framework26
for the analysis of recovery. The capabilities approach27
“(. . . ) reworks recovery not from within (where it remains hostage to a rhetoric of28
su↵ering) but from without (informed by an idiom of opportunity). Not healing but29
equality becomes the operant trope (. . . ). This arms us to undress both immediate30
grievances experiences of humiliation and shame (. . . ) and long-term prospects for31
growth and development.” (Hopper, 2007, p.875).32
The capability approach serves indeed an interesting reference point for33
our analysis, since it readdresses recovery as a question of resources, agency34
and opportunities. Nevertheless, we should keep in mind that the capabilities35
approach originates from, and is dedicated to structural problems of resource36
distribution and the opportunities for education etc. It misses however the37
adequate theoretic tools to grasp issues, in those cases in which structural38
factors are less involved in the conditioning of the individual’s capabilities,39
whereas a major role is played by an acute personal crisis of loss of power40
which impairs the subject’s capabilities and functionings. We will focus on41
the recovery process in precisely this sense, analyze the socio-cognitive com-42
ponents with the theoretic tools of Cristiano Castelfranchi’s framework. This43
means that the actual beliefs and goals involved, the emotions implied in the44
subject’s journey frommental illness to recovery, will be sought for, in order to45
draft a social cognitive model of recovery. Starting point must be the impaired46
subject’s su↵ering from mental illness.47
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2 Su↵ering fromMental Illness1
According toMariaMiceli andCristianoCastelfranchi “psychic su↵ering is de-2
fined as the su↵ering implied by a frustrating assumption, that is, a particular3
kind of discrepancy between a belief and a goal, embedding a time specifica-4
tion for both the goal and the belief representation” (Miceli and Castelfranchi.5
1997 p. 769).6
The frustrating assumptions implicated in thephenomenonofmental illness7
are multiple. Several narratives of people with severe mental illness focus on8
frustration assumptions which concern the belief and feeling to be unable to9
trust in one’s own perception and capabilities, or, its self-trust.10
“Slowly I descend into a paranoid state, of course afraid to tell anyone about it.11
The feelings become possessive and I feel myself without a sense of knowing who12
I am. Am I a vent for the fear in humanity? Is it the unconscious fear in humanity13
or am I just afraid my humanity has become? Perhaps there is no di↵erence. These14
intellectualizations do not distract me from my worry.” (Paul Hewitt, 2001; p.5)15
The loss of self-trust has a huge impact on the system of beliefs and goals16
of the agent, since it represents an instrumental capability for the totality of an17
agent’s goals. What happens can be conceptualized as a vicious circle of a loss18
of powers (Castelfranchi, 2003):19
“There is either a virtuous or a vicious circle between (. . . ) personal power (. . . ) (i.e.20
being able and in condition to achieve goals) and Social Power. Any lack of personal21
power (lack of abilities, competence, knowledge, controlled resources) reduces the22
various forms of social power, and the probabilities of having goal-adoption relation-23
ships able to increase that power.” (Castelfranchi, 2003, p. 232)24
Not surprisingly, people with experience of mental disease are exposed to25
conditions of disadvantage on multiple levels (e.g. HEA, 1997; Lahtinen, 1999;26
Wilkinson and Marmot, 1998; Eaton and Harrison, 1998; Hosman and Llopis,27
2004; Patel and Kleinman, 2003). As outlined by Castelfranchi above, both the28
inherent nature ofmental health problems and the discriminatory responses to29
them have ruinous e↵ects on interpersonal relationships, causing a significant30
reductionof social contacts (Huxley andThornicroft, 2003). Psychiatric patients31
are four timesmore likely than the average not to have a close friend, andmore32
than one-third of patients say that they have no one to turn to for help (Meltzer33
et al, 1995; Evan and Huxley, 2000).34
Mental illness goes hand in hand with the process of psychiatric treatment.35
Starting from the first diagnosis, to the actual therapeutic treatment mainly36
based on pharmacological interventions and the support provided by mental37
health facilities, the individual becomes an object of treatment byprofessionals.38
2.1 Psychiatric treatment39
“For the majority (. . . ) the first contact with psychiatry represents a further turn on40
the downward spiral. It is confirmation of one’s worthlessness, an extension of the41
experience of neglect in early life” (Topor, 2001, p.182).42
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Despite the number of longitudinal studies (Ciompi, 1980; Bleuer, 1978;1
Harding et al, 1987; WHO, 1973; WHO, 1979; Le↵ et al, 1992) documenting the2
positive development of mental illness mostly in the absence of psychiatric3
institutions, a large share of psychiatric professionals still considers it incurable4
(Bachrach, 1996).5
“I was a schizophrenic, they said “please remember that, oh, and while you are it,6
remember to stop thinking there is a cure, you are a chronic, a chronic schizophrenic,7
a biological defect with an incurable disease.” (Runciman in Romme et al., 2009, p.8
256).9
This kind of prognosis, and the contact with psychiatric facilities create neg-10
ative expectations for the future, disappointments and existential delusions:11
“At the day centre I got a picture about expectations of what life was going to be like. I12
was then only fifteen and I spentmy daywith older people (. . . ). I was given a diagno-13
sis of schizophrenia and di↵erent professionals- nurses, social workers, psychologist14
and psychiatrists- all gave the same sort of message, time and time again: my prospect15
for the future were “not great”: I shouldn’t have expectations about school, or work,16
or having any relationships” (Hendry in Romme et al., 2009 p. 310).17
Psychiatric care is experienced as18
“Going round in circles and not going anywhere. It was very frightening and I felt19
such hopelessness. No one in the psychiatric services gaveme any hope, in fact, it was20
the opposite” (Reid, in Romme et al., 2009, p. 119).21
Hopelessness is due to the establishment of the belief about the impossibility22
to recover. The goal to recover becomes a mere wish:23
“In other words, hopelessness still implies wish or desire. What is lacking is precisely24
the belief of possibility, which is replaced by its opposite: a belief of impossibility. It25
is the persistence of the desire, coupled with the belief of impossibility that accounts26
for the su↵ering of hopelessness.” (Miceli and Castelfranchi, 2010, p.258)27
2.1.1 Compliance28
“To my astonishment the psychiatrists that I tried to tell (abuses in childhood) either29
denied my experience or told me that I would never, ever recover from what had30
happened. They told me that I had an illness. I was mentally ill. I was expected to be31
the passive recipient of treatment for a disorder I had; that medications was the only32
option open to me, and that, actually, I would never really get better anyway. No one33
ever asked me what I thought might help” (Dillon in Romme et al., 2009 p.189).34
Psychiatry o↵ers treatment in exchange for compliance. Compliance refers35
to the subject’s “acceptance” of the role of the patient in its relation with the36
mental health professional. Due to the enormous legal powers (even coercion)37
of the psychiatrist as an institutional agent, the significance and implications38
of compliance are substantial for the life of the patient. To consider is here39
that the psychiatrist potentially decides where the patient should live (station-40
ary or hospitalized treatment), the psychotropic substances for the treatment,41
whether or not to work, the patient’s legal accountability, etc. Consider further42
the desperate mental state of a person turning to psychiatry for help to get43
treatment under the condition of compliance:44
354 Ra↵aella Pocobello and Tarek el Sehity
“I got the message that I was a passive victim of pathology. I wasn’t encouraged1
to do anything to actively help myself. Therapy meant drug therapy. It was hugely2
disempowering. It was all undermine my sense of self, exacerbating all my doubts3
about myself.” (Longden, in Romme et al., 2009, p. 143).4
Evidently, what is at stake with compliance, regards a large part of a per-5
son’s natural ownership, where a significant portion of existential decisions is6
delegated to the hands of the professional:7
When I became a client of psychiatry I lost everything job, studies, friends not to8
mention my self-respect, self-worth, hope and dreams. When I got back my life I9
thought it was only temporary as I had been taught and told that schizophrenia was10
chronic and incurable.” (Runciman in Romme et al., 2009, p. 259).11
2.1.2 Medication: a reductionist annihilation12
The impact of medication in the context of mental illness is not limited to13
its mental e↵ects and its “side-e↵ects” on the mental as well as physiological14
level, but touches upon the conceptual level of agency and the self. Themedical15
intervention implicitly or explicitly conveys a reductionist message:16
• “Your compliance (taking the medication) is essential for the success of17
the treatment” ! “the plan for your treatment is not yours but part of18
professional expertise”19
• “The cause of your mental su↵ering does not depend on you but on your20
physiological state”! “you do not control your body, but the body controls21
you”22
The administration of psychotropic drugs as a principal focus of the profes-23
sional intervention combined with the patient’s compliance to the treatment24
lead to the often described annihilation of the person. The reductionist ap-25
proach is methodologically and even epistemologically based on the assump-26
tion of strict upwards causation1. The reductionist approach to mental illness27
is for this reason necessarily an approach which transgresses the subject as28
an arbitrary entity of social life, since the search and focus of the treatment29
is centered on the elementary constituents of the same. What might be a cu-30
rious (however legal) technicality of treatment from the “objective” point of31
view of the medicating therapist, becomes a peculiar experience for the sub-32
ject of mental illness and even paradox when the subject’s compliance is taken33
into account: through compliance, both, the therapist as well as the patient34
“decide” to act as if the subject were complying. From the reductionist point35
of view – and what is even more dramatic – from a legal point of view, the36
“decision” itself is to be regarded a formal (though legal) technicality, given37
that the subject is regarded as subjected (caused) by its mental illness, a cause38
beyond the subject’s “control”. From a consequent reductionist point of view39
on the relation between the medicating therapist and the medicated patient40
1 Consequently, the notion of downwards causation, or even mental causation represents
for the reductionist the inacceptable notion of a causa sui.
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there remains only one reasonable instance of observation for both parties: the1
monitoring eyes of the therapist.2
3 Recovery3
3.1 “Recovery exists”: Surprise and Admiration4
Probably themost important starting point in the recovery process lies in some5
form of surprise:6
“(. . . ) a fellow voice hearer who at my first hearing voices group asked me if I heard7
voices and when I replied that I did, told me that they were real. It does not sound8
much, but that one sentence has been a compass for me showing me the direction9
I needed to travel and underpinning my belief in the recovery process.” (Coleman,10
2004, p.12)11
Often the surprise consists in the evidence that equal others (peers) have12
managed to recover from the same kind of disease, despite all expectations,13
and even severer, against all expert prognosis. The surprise leads to a be-14
lief revision process (Lorini and Castelfranchi, 2007) necessary to initiate the15
recovery process.16
“My recovery started when I met another service user who worked for a charity. It17
was a real eye-opener, because she was also a user but she had a job, a partner, a18
house, all things I was led to believe I couldn’t have, things that were beyond me.”19
(Steward Hendry in Romme et al, 2009, p.11)20
In fact, the belief on which the personal hopeless condition was previously21
based gets questioned, and generates desires and goals which have been com-22
promised by the beliefs of incurability and chronicity. The belief revision pro-23
cess represents an essential turning point in the career of the survivor where24
the aspirations for a meaningful life beyond the illness regain momentum.25
Evidently, a crucial condition lies in the trusted source of the information,26
characterized by a large body of shared experiences. By the example of a trusted27
equal, the subject gains anawareness of its ownpowers and its “real” chances to28
recover. Even if the source for the initiation of the recovery process lies external29
to the subject, the fact that it comes from an evaluated “equal” changes the30
objective uncertainty into a felt degree of certainty, as if it were a repetition task31
in the form of a script of something already achieved. The powerful cognitive32
shortcutwhereby another’s successful goal achievement evaluated as if it were33
one’s own achievement, brings about an interesting emotional shift concerning34
the self: from a sense of helpless inferiority (wanting p [meaningful life] alike Y35
[another] but not being able to achieve p) to a sense of admiration (esteeming36
Y for achieving p unlike X [oneself]) to emulation (evaluating Y equal to X and37
deducing that X can achieve p) (see Castelfranchi and Miceli, 2009, p.225↵).38
This is why especially self-help groups need to be considered of fundamental39
value for the recovering subject.40
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Mutual understanding in the exchange of experiences provokes more than1
just the insight of new possibilities – it creates a mind-frame in which recovery2
is experienced as if it were already happening to oneself. It is not theory and3
reasoning which convinces about a “probability of recovery” as it might even4
be presented from mental health professionals, but the actual evidence of its5
real possibility.6
3.2 From Hope to Trust7
As presented in our recovery review above, the hope to recover forms the8
conceptual core in many accounts of recovery. Hope as the motivational base9
of the recovery process is however overstressed. As evidenced in Miceli and10
Castelfranchi’s (2010) analysis of hope, though referring to a desired goal,11
the individual’s expectations of its actual achievement are not certain at all.12
Hope is characterized by an uncertainty which does not allow to engage in13
the actual planning of actions or decisions, since the hoping individual has no14
“clue” about what to do or how to decide in order to achieve the desired goal.15
For this reason, hope is characterized by temporal permanence, since it misses16
the actual criteria which would allow for the “falsification” of the goal it refers17
to. Further, the hoped for goal achievement concludes almost necessarily in a18
positive surprise, similar to the receiving of a gift which is obtained without19
a deeper understanding of the circumstances which have brought it about.20
While forming the positive ground for the mere possibility of recovery to21
exist, and as such constituting a necessary condition for the recovery process22
to take place, hope is insu cient for the activation of the recovery process, for23
it lacks a plan execution, the know-how for acting to achieve the desired goal24
(Castelfranchi and Pocobello, 2007). Rather, external circumstances might be25
vaguely assumed to bring about the hoped for goal.26
“If we did not distinguish what is most likely to happen from our wishes about27
mere possibilities, we might undergo serious consequences in terms of planning,28
commitment to, and pursuit of unfeasible goals.” (Miceli and Castelfranchi, 2010,29
p266)30
A form of e ciency rationalization, whereby probable goals are distin-31
guished from possible ones, presents a class of goals which can be taken into32
account, however not be counted on. As such, hoped-for-goals remain in the33
hands of unknown factors and powers and would not only be insu cient34
to maintain the recovery process, but also contraindicated since this feeling35
induces some sort of passivity due to lack of (action-) plans an agent could36
be committed to. Therefore, rather than hope, it is trust (Castelfranchi, 1998;37
Castelfranchi and Falcone, 2010) which must be considered an essential form38
of motivation for the goal of recovery. The role of trust in the recovery process39
should be considered two-ways:40
• As a trustor, when the subject has to evaluate the source of the recovery41
information as a trustworthy evidence of recovery (“trust-that” recovery).42
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At this level the subject has to act as a social trustor – the ability to trust1
and believe what was formerly assumed impossible (social trust as a key-2
element of the belief revision process after the initial surprise);3
• As a trustee:4
– at the individual level, when the person needs to trust in its own capa-5
bilities – the capabilities which need to be trusted and appropriated, that6
is, recovered (trust-in);7
– at the social level, when the individual has to recover its role as a valuable8
trustee. At this level the evident complex of problems originating from9
stigmatization have to be confronted.10
In both roles – as a trustor as well as a trustee – the resumed power to decide11
and not to comply, the commitment to pursue one’s own trusted goals and to12
decide to count on trusted others rather than entitled professionals, constitute13
instances towards the reestablishment of ownership and responsibility.14
3.3 “Recovery happens”: Ownership as the Core of Recovery15
“Ownership is the key to recovery. We must learn to own our experiences whatever16
they are. Doctors cannot own our experiences, psychologist cannot own our experi-17
ences, nurses, social workers, support workers, occupational therapist, psychothera-18
pists, carers, and friends cannot own our experiences. Even our lovers cannot own our19
experiences. We must own our experiences. For it is only true owning the experience20
of madness can we own the recovery from madness.” (Coleman, 2004, p.16)21
Coleman’s emphasis on the role of ownership in the recovery process is22
shared by many survivors in one form or another as a core piece on the jour-23
ney to recovery. Formulations such as “regaining one’s life”, “taking your24
life in your own hands”, “claiming responsibility for one’s decisions and ac-25
tions”, indicate essential parts of ownership in the survivors’ description of26
the recovery process.27
To grasp some of the essential components of the appropriation process28
generally, and re-appropriation more specifically, it is necessary to consider29
ownership as a socio-cognitive process in various stages: from recognition and30
acceptance of the object of ownership to its social claim and defense against31
others to the taking of responsibility and its social recognition.32
3.3.1 Recovering the resources: Acceptance33
Next to the surprise trigger in the belief revision process, acceptance forms a34
substantial mental settling process in which a gradual change of perspectives35
takes place:36
“An acceptance attitude can serve adaptive functions (. . . ). The acceptance of the37
problem, and hence, its inclusion in the reality perceived by the person, permits38
a form of adaptation that extends beyond dealing with, and possibly solving, that39
358 Ra↵aella Pocobello and Tarek el Sehity
specific problem. Even when one’s goals are irrevocably thwarted, acceptance of1
these facts permits to readjust one’s plans, project, and aspirations. By recognizing the2
harm su↵ered, the person can, in fact, not only avoid useless persistence (by accepting3
things that cannot be changed) but also ascertain whether the existing situation also4
presents some unexpected positive aspects and take advantage of them” (Miceli and5
Castelfranchi, 2001, p.294)6
What is considered inacceptable, the targeted object of an e↵ort at elimina-7
tion, the mental source of su↵ering and frustration, has to be reframed and8
reevaluated as a formof resource. Especially in the case ofmental illness,where9
the perceived source of su↵ering constitutes an intrinsic part of the self which10
is continuously objectified and externalized (“singled out”, “identified”) for11
treatment purpose (“symptom control”), a radical belief revision process ded-12
icated to the inversion of the clinical estrangement process has to take place,13
whereby symptoms become accessible resources:14
15
“I accepted my voices as real16
I stopped trying to get rid of them, but accepted them as personal17
I became conscious of ownership of my voices18
I stopped looking for a cause outside myself19
I looked for solutions in my self20
I explored what had happened in my life that might have a relationship with my21
voices22
I accepted those emotions which I did not like and could not easily master”23
(Sue Clarkson in Romme et al, 2009, p 316f)24
The acceptance of what was a mere symptom as something “real” plays a25
fundamental role in the acceptance process, for what is not real should not26
be there and cannot form a reliable resource for whatever goal. For Coleman27
(see p. 357 above) this reframingwas the starting point of the recovery process.28
What is at stakehere is the subject’s essence in thepower to claim its own reality,29
not in the form of a delirium, but as a fact it can actually share with equals (e.g.30
voice hearers). Once this fundamental question is settled, the resources can be31
accessed and employed, in a search for their use, and even more, in a search32
for their use for the recovering subject.33
Thus, the motivational dimension – as outlined when discussing trust –34
builds an essential prerequisite in the means-ends-reasoning, for means are35
to be defined by the goals they serve for. Due to the emergence of a feasible36
scheme through the emulation of the recovery process as demonstrated by a37
trusted survivor, instrumental goals and the necessarymeans for their achieve-38
ment are recognized. The guiding example of recovered individuals as well as39
the technique of recovery oriented training interventions provide valuable ev-40
idence for the way in which the object of su↵ering is reevaluated and accepted41
as a part of oneself, rather than fought as a symptom. Instructive are here the42
first steps towards the re-appropriation of voices in the voice-hearer trainings43
which are based on the principle of giving sense to voices (Romme and Es-44
cher, 1993, 1996) and working towards the recognition of voices as a personal45
and deeply connected part with one’s life-story. The accidental nature of the46
symptom, a view inherently expressed through the medication treatment in47
the reductionist approach tomental illness, is necessarily elaborated as a causal48
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part of the personal life-story. The symptoms are recognized as a part of one’s1
self. The deficit is recovered as a source of information for the subject to accept2
and meaningfully incorporate it in its self-conception.3
3.3.2 The social grounding of Recovery: Responsibility4
Even if responsibility as a concept does not form an explicit part in many5
accounts of recovery frommental illness, it needs to be regarded as the consti-6
tutive frame of ownership on which the whole complex of mental illness and7
recovery rests. It is for the loss of accountability that mental illness is repre-8
sented as a sever threat to the society and forms the reason for neglecting the9
subject’s rights of ownership in the court of legal judgment. The legal system10
defines and prescribes accountability as a necessary condition for the indi-11
vidual to be judged as a subject of responsibility. The legal consequences for12
the subject of mental illness, often considered a sort of collateral to its mental13
su↵ering, builds necessarily the forefront of the recovery process.14
Reclaiming the ownership of resources, be they cognitive, social ormaterial,15
internal or external, is not just a claim of access to their use, but implies a16
social justification process for their use. Counting on the owner of resources to17
have awareness about the potential e↵ects of their use is what account-ability18
refers to. The impressive consequences on the subject, once accountability19
is psychologically and even legally disapproved, give plain evidence of the20
significance of ownership, and more precisely, the psychological significance21
of responsibility.22
The psychological literature treats responsibility mainly against the back-23
ground of Heider’s (1958) attribution theory, evidencing the mental compo-24
nents of responsibility such as internal attribution of the cause, intention of25
the actual e↵ect, foreseeability of the e↵ect and social justification of the cause26
(Hamilton, 1978). The more existential implications which are at stake with27
the judgment of responsibility have however remained in the backdrop of this28
conception of responsibility. Responsibility is not just about the question of29
whom to address for guilt and merit of e↵ects, about the social coverage of30
actual and potential risks and events, but about a social frame of reference31
whereby a subject’s significance as an agent is included or excluded, present or32
absent, declared or denied. The social negation of responsibility is therefore not33
just the negation of ownership (object of responsibility), but must be consid-34
ered as the negation of a “true” locus of decision or intention (el Sehity, 2011).35
In its generalized form, as in the case of severe mental illness, the complete36
negation of accountability cannot but bring about a progressive annihilation37
of the subject.38
Let us consider here the case where responsibility is not just denied to the39
subject (“we know, it is not your fault. . . ”) but personally given up by a subject40
in crisis:41
“It was clear tome then, too, that I wanted someone else to take over the responsibility.42
I couldn’t do it on my own. I desperately wanted someone else to do it.” (Narratives43
in Topor, 2001, p.183)44
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By renouncing responsibility, the subject transfers the ownership of its pow-1
ers to the “custody” of a more powerful/competent party. This transfer can be2
regarded as a standard component of tutorial relations (Conte &Castelfranchi,3
1995; Castelfranchi & Falcone, 2010): The subject itself lacks su cient aware-4
ness of its true interests so that another party is put in charge to decide for it. In5
the subject’s state of acute mental crisis, the tutor takes over the full powers of6
the individual and is charged with the responsibility for the same. From there7
on the subject finds itself in a situation of “structured irresponsibility” where8
the tutor forms a socio-cognitive shield not only against failure and blame but9
also success and merit.10
As stressed by Castelfranchi, the tutor should have the active goal to resti-11
tute the delegated powers to the individual as soon as possible. This would be12
natural, given the overwhelming weight of responsibility the tutor assumes.13
The tragedy of the transfer of responsibility in the psychiatric context lies14
however in the fact (1) that the tutorial relation is embedded in an institutional15
frame, where the subjects are confined to their roles based on “responsibility”16
(professional) and “non-responsibility” (client), and (2) that the delegated re-17
sponsibility cannot be recovered from “the” professional, but must be claimed18
in the social arena by the means of trusted exchanges, and more specifically, in19
the subject’s role as a veritable trustee2. Reclaiming responsibility represents20
the main struggle of the recovering subject, a struggle that is ventured socially21
in the sense of gaining back the right of ownership as a trusted subject of22
responsibility, and individually, through the reestablishment of an internal as23
well as stable “locus of control”.24
3.3.3 Recovering internality: The social claim25
The acceptance of proper resources and the claim of responsibility for these26
formulate a social claim, for what is considered to be responsibly owned by27
one cannot be meaningfully claimed by another. The social claim of own-28
ership addresses an essential component of the recovering individual as an29
autonomous subject. The recovery process necessarily conflicts with the pa-30
tient rolewhich is defined by the subject’s compliance to the expert treatment it31
is submitted/committed to. The social claim of ownership represents therefore32
an essential emacipatory act towards the subject’s full rights as a citizen:33
“Even if I am an unlucky person, I’m still a free citizen and no one can make me take34
anything. They can say “why don’t you try to get better?” and Dr. M. is a doctor who35
cures people with medicine, all doctors cure people with medicine. (. . . ) I definitely36
needed something more complete, a more complete course of treatment. When we37
disagreed on this, I practically bared my teeth at him and said: “we’re not going to38
get into legal things here, are we? Or give me social assistance which I have a right to,39
remembering that I’m, to all intends and purposes, a free citizen or I’m going to call40
2 A socio-cognitive account of responsibility could find seminal foundation within the theo-
retic framework of the trustee as recently presented in Castelfranchi and Falcone’s compre-
hensive monograph “Trust Theory” (2010). Of specific interest for the analysis of responsi-
bility has to be considered their chapter “On the Trustee’s Side: Trust as Relational Capital”
(2010, Chap 10).
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a lawyer, what do you want from me?” . . . And now I don’t take anything.” (Luca in1
Mezzina et al., 2006, p.50)2
Without the social claim of one’s own decisions, own rights, agency powers,3
the individual’s ownership would turn into mere properties in the sense of4
an object’s qualities, but not constitute potentials at full disposition of the5
individual.Ownership in general, andmore specifically in the recoveryprocess6
from mental illness, leads necessarily to an emancipatory act, whereby the7
subject’s internality is (re)established and socially claimed as the definite locus8
(a claim implicitly and explicitly undermined by the medical approach to9
mental illness, when the focus is set on the pharmacological treatment). This10
claim requires not only the personal commitment to control but also depends11
on the social recognition and acceptance of the same.12
The aggressive attitude shown in Luca’s statement above further indicates13
an instrumental emotive component of the recovery process where the sub-14
ject’s struggle for personal power becomes palpable. Recovering from a long-15
standing career of “structured dis-empowerment” (medication, manipulation,16
coercion to-, persuasion to-, suggestion to- and conviction to comply), a fun-17
damental rearrangement of social dependencies and power-balances has to be18
considered as an almost inevitable part of the recovery process in which the19
emotive dimension is decisive. We will address two forms of this dimension20
relevant for the reclaim of the individual power-to and the social reclaim of21
power-over respectively: self-trust and emancipator pride.22
Self-trust and Recovery Exchange23
On the individual level a self-trust task is the necessary condition for the24
recovering subject to challenge the socially recognized powers of experts and25
professionals, and their prognostic judgments about its future.26
“Within the realms of psychiatric practice it is accepted that the most powerful practi-27
tioner is the psychiatrist. Their power is rooted not only in the authority given to them28
by the state, but also in their singular right to make diagnosis. It is this ownership29
of a supposed expert knowledge that gives them so much power over their clients.30
I would content that the real expert of the client’s experience is the client and it is31
they not the psychiatrist that own the knowledge that makes recovery a possibility.”32
(Coleman, 2004, p.56)33
The belief that one’s recovery is not just possible but even probable is34
necessarily based on self-trust, that is, trust in one’s own powers, for:35
“It is not enough ‘to be able to‘: in order to really be able, having the power of, the agent36
must also belief (be aware) of having the ‘power of’, otherwise they will renounce,37
they will nor exploit their skills nor resources.” (Castelfranchi & Falcone, 2010, p.48)38
The attitude of acceptance, its underlying cognitive process of belief-39
revision, provides an essential cognitive output which needs to be trusted40
in order to form a solid base for the social claim of ownership to be ventured.41
Self-trust is likely best initiated and promoted by the experience of being so-42
cially considered a veritable trustee. To be counted on, to be entrustedwith real43
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values, such as the case in significant economic exchange relations, provides1
the individual with an evidence based belief in its formerly lost accountability.2
It is well recognized that reciprocation plays an important role for the in-3
dividual’s health and well-being in interpersonal relationships in self-help4
groups (Buunk & Schaufeli, 1999). Di↵erent to the implicit or explicit subjec-5
tion to professional expertise (power), help is o↵ered by request and not by6
default. Equally, there is no social role by default which might lead to the7
subject’s subalternity. This reciprocity leads to the reestablishment of mean-8
ingful relationships repairing the social damage inflicted by the isolation and9
discrimination of mental health users. Through self-help groups the subject10
recreates a network of mutual dependencies accounting for its powers as well11
as its needs:12
“Themain function of pro-social or positive sociality is themultiplication of the power13
of the participating agents. (. . . ) Any agent, while remaining limited in its capabilities,14
skill and resources, finds the number of goals it can pursue and achieve increased by15
virtue of its “use” of others’ skills and resources.” (Castelfranchi, 2003, p. 228f)16
With each step in the reciprocal exchange the subject regains confidence in17
its powers leading to the rehabilitation of its identity:18
“Positive experiences prepare the groundwork for improving one’s self-image. As19
the person’s self-image becomes increasingly more positive, it becomes a resource20
for coping with symptoms and the stigma that the person now has to contend with.21
The new self-image begins more and more to function as a protective shield against22
residual signs of illness and detrimental aspects of the environment and living con-23
ditions. The insight that one can influence one’s environment provides a foundation24
for managing the illness.” (Topor, 2001 p. 122)25
The conquest of self-trust inevitably brings about a growing conquest of26
social ground, rejecting on one hand the unjust presumptions and on the other27
hand challenging the community with the subject’s unexpected powers. The28
latter finds its open expression in the form of emancipatory pride as evidenced29
by social movements such as Mad-pride.30
Mad-pride31
The experience of mental illness is unfortunately too often connected to an32
experience of shame and humiliation. Shame represents hereby an experience33
with painful and devastating e↵ects on the subject as a whole and not only just34
a specific behavior. Shame is a moral emotion, in the sense that it acts as an el-35
ement of self-assessment with profound relational implications (Castelfranchi36
and Poggi, 1988 [2005]). Humiliation refers to an action (humiliate or being37
humiliated) and the experience of the subject (to feel oneself humiliated). It is38
amental process of subjugation that damages or dampens pride, honor or dig-39
nity since the negative evaluation of the humiliator is shared by the humiliated40
subject (Silver et al, 1986).41
For the subject’s recovery process it is indispensable that the originally42
shared humiliating evaluation is reevaluated and disagreed upon at a certain43
stage. The subject perceives the unjust evaluation as expressed by others as44
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an o↵ensive act to which it wrongfully agreed upon. Through hindsight, the1
recovering subject reframes the humiliating events of its negative evaluation2
as direct evidence of social injustice and discrimination, as an o↵ence against3
its social integrity it needs to oppose to.4
“We make a radical demand, one of the most di cult to fulfill: we insist that people5
get inside our heads and skins and try to empathize. This is something that all outsider6
groups have demanded, yet the experience of psychosis may be the most forbidding7
of all. Our plea cannot be “we are just like you” because that isn’t true. On the other8
hand it is not completely untrue.” (Stephen Weiner, in Hatfield & Levley, 1993, p. 4)9
Anti-stigma movements are devoted to the change of their participants’10
social identity by the construction of a “political identity”. Anspach (1979) de-11
scribes how the participation of former psychiatric patients in political move-12
ments generates an experience of self-determination,which replaces the feeling13
of powerlessness and helplessness. The movement’s objective transfers into a14
new self-conception, a process which implies the development of a feeling of15
pride.16
When the subject stops to believe that its experience of mental illness is17
something to be ashamed of, accepting and reevaluating it, several emotions18
are likely to emerge: anger and revenge for the personal experience of social19
discrimination, and indignation for this kind of social injustice. This is the20
emotive base of a form of pride that we call “emancipatory pride” which has21
an internal as well as social reparative function (Pocobello and Castelfranchi,22
2009):23
• Internally, emancipatory pride is functional to the subject to recover from24
shame. Not necessarily the subject is truly convinced that “madness” is25
something to be proud of, but it needs to be convinced that it is something26
for which it unjustly felt ashamed of, that it is not justified to be judged neg-27
atively for mental illness. The emergence of this form of pride promotes the28
key-elements of the recovery process such as self-acceptance, self-trust and29
reduces the sense of inferiority caused by the experience of stigmatization.30
• Socially, the exhibition of a “mad-pride” is functional and probably even31
strategic to the change of the social evaluation of “madness” and the social32
conditions in which persons with mental disease live. This pride implies a33
message of non subjugation - “I do not care about your judgment” and a34
provocation challenging the societal evaluation of madness.35
4 The re-covered Subject36
“I had a longing to come back to myself. I had almost left my good house for good, to37
see it as such, so to speak.” (Richard in Topor, 2001, p.181)38
The semantic core of re-covery in terms of to-cover o↵ers a rich metaphoric39
message concerning the actual situation of the subject of mentally illness:40
the psychiatric patient’s condition as a nude existence vis-à-vis a reductionist41
search to un-cover the subject’s dysfunctional components, cannot be better42
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captured than in the subject’s claim for a “cover” to re-cover. The deprivation1
of internality due to the investigative clinical procedure, due to the transparent2
existence in the clinic, due to the continuous exhibition of its pathology in the3
therapeutic activity, due to delegated or even negated personal accountability,4
due to growing unilateral dependencies, due to the justification of means and5
needs etc. a literal re-covering is mandatory for a subject to reclaim “a life in6
its own rights”.7
The processes and stages from mental illness to recovery as outlined in this8
draft unfold along the narrative of an uncovered/discovered human subject9
and its need for its own cover. The last act of this drama of the re-covered10
subject touches upon the social context, the social admiration – even if silent –11
of the shameless subject of madpride.12
Evidently, thewhole story of the subject’s recovery process can be recounted13
more coherently in terms of power relations, against the background of disem-14
powerment as well as empowerment processes. Hopefully you remain avail-15
able to this chapter of the recovered subject, Cristiano?16
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Part V1
Trust & delegation2
